This article investigates whether prenotification decreases postdisplacement joblessness. Reduced-form estimates indicate that lengthy written notice is associated with small increases in the probability of avoiding nonemployment but with no decline in average durations. Significant reductions are found, however, for household heads, women, nonwhites, and in local labor markets with high unemployment rates. A new method is developed to control for the endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice. This procedure suggests that previous research substantially overstates the degree to which prenotification reduces nonemployment and indicates that the actual decrease is between 2 and 5 working days.
I. Introduction
During the last decade, the United States has witnessed a lively policy debate concerning the efficacy of legislation mandating employer advance notification of plant shutdowns and mass layoffs. More than 125 bills relating to plant closings were presented in 30 states between 1975 and 1983, and over 40 laws have been proposed at the federal level since 1979. Culminating this effort, the Worker Assistance and Retraining Notification Act (Public Law 100-379), which requires employers to provide 60 days' advance notice of plant closures and of large-scale layoffs, was passed into Ruhm law in 1988. Although the legislation contains numerous exemptions, with its passage the United States has joined virtually all other industrialized countries in regulating enterprise shutdowns and mass terminations.1
This activity has taken place in the absence of reliable information on either the benefits or costs of mandatory notice. The situation has recently improved, however, with the release of several studies using nationally representative data from special Displaced Workers Supplements (DWS) to the January 1984 and January 1986 Current Population Surveys (CPS) (see, e.g., Addison and Portugal 1987a; Podgursky and Swaim 1987; Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988; Kletzer 1989) .2 This work suggests that prior notification decreases expected joblessness by around 1 month, mostly by raising the probability of avoiding nonemployment altogether. There is little evidence of reduced joblessness for persons who are unable to obtain immediate reemployment.3
Unfortunately, the usefulness of this research is lessened because of limitations inherent in the data sources and methodological approaches. Two data shortcomings are particularly troublesome. First, because the 1984 and 1986 DWS provide no information on either the duration or type of notice, investigators are unable to distinguish among written notification, verbal announcements, and expectations of job loss in the absence of any type of notice. They also cannot differentiate the effects of short versus lengthy notice. Second, data on joblessness are limited to total weeks out of work between the date of displacement and the surveys, whether this transpires in a single spell or in multiple occurrences punctuated by short periods of employment. This is problematic for econometric duration models that typically require continuous spell information. Furthermore, for policy purposes, we are often interested in the initial period of joblessness.
Previous studies have also paid relatively little attention to the potential endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice and have focused on average impacts rather than on the potentially large variations across worker, job, and geographic characteristics. Even if the average impact of early warning is fairly small, large benefits might accrue to population 1. Companies are required to provide advance notice and to negotiate with their employees and governments over layoffs in Canada and most Western European countries. By contrast, before 1988, only three states (Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii) had legislated any form of mandatory advance notice, with three others (Massachusetts, Maryland, and Michigan) having voluntary programs encouraging companics to provide warning or to continue employee benefits.
2. Also see Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984) for an earlier investigation using enterprise-level data for the state of Maine. 3. Because the DWS does not distinguish between unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force, the terms "joblessness" or "nonemployment" (rather than "unemployment") will be used throughout.
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The failure of earlier work to distinguish between informal and written notification is problematic for several reasons. First, the two types of notice need not change workers' estimates of the probabilities of impending job terminations in the same way. If they do not, their impact on predisplacement search behavior and subsequent joblessness will differ. Second, since workers unusually well informed about labor market conditions are relatively likely to both anticipate displacements and become rapidly reemployed, estimates of the effects of informal notice are likely to overstate the benefits of formal notification. Third, some respondents may foresee their displacements prior to receiving written notice. If they act on these expectations by searching for new work, then the subsample acquiring formal notice will be disproportionately composed of persons who have looked for but failed to obtain new positions. These individuals will also typically have relatively long expected durations of postdisplacement joblessness.
This study improves on each of the above shortcomings. A newly available data set ( the 1988 DWS) is utilized that contains information on the type and timing of notice and on the duration of the initial spell of joblessness.5 Reduced-form estimates are obtained for a model that includes full interactions between advance notice and the nonnotification covariates, as well as for a more conventional equation where early warning influences only the regression intercept. Finally, a new method is developed and implemented to provide endogeneity-corrected estimates of the effects of endogenously provided advance notification.
Four primary findings are highlighted. First, earlier research substantially overstates the extent to which prenotification reduces postdisplacement joblessness. This occurs both because of the inability to distinguish between formal and informal notice, using previously available data sets, and because of the failure to correct for the endogeneity of advance notice.
Second, although reduced-form regressions continue to show that both informal notice and lengthy formal notification are associated with increased probabilities of avoiding joblessness altogether, only the former are also correlated with shorter average nonemployment durations.
Third, substantial differences are observed across population subgroups. Of particular interest, formal notice received more than 2 months before the displacement is associated with significantly reduced joblessness for 4. Podgursky and Swaim (1987) and Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) have allowed for some demographic group variations but have not included a full set of interactions.
5. Addison and Portugal (1989) have contemporaneously used the 1988 DWS to study some of the questions focused on in this article. Ruhm household heads, females, nonwhites, and displaced workers residing in local labor markets with high rates of unemployment.
Fourth, the endogeneity of voluntarily provided notice is important. Formal warnings are disproportionately obtained by individuals possessing unobserved characteristics correlated with low reemployment probabilities, informal notification by workers with higher hazard rates out of nonemployment. After implementing a new procedure to account for this unobserved heterogeneity, prenotification is calculated to reduce postdisplacement joblessness by an average of between 2 days and 1 week. This estimate is only one-fourth to one-eighth as large as that typically obtained in previous research.
II. Data
This article uses data from the Displaced Worker Supplement to the January 1988 Current Population Survey. The 1988 DWS contains retrospective information on previous job histories and on labor market status for a nationally representative sample of workers suffering permanent job loss between 1983 and January 1988. Included in the supplement are persons leaving their jobs prior to displacement (either to begin new positions or search for work), as well as those remaining with their predisplacement employers until the termination date.6
The sample analyzed includes workers between the ages of 25 and 60 who, at the survey date, lost jobs as the result of a business failure, plant closure or relocation, or a layoff resulting from slack work or from a position or shift being abolished. Persons terminating positions in agriculture, construction, or the armed forces are excluded, as are previously self-employed individuals and those displaced in the month of the survey.
The 1988 DWS includes three questions pertaining to advance notice. The first inquires whether the worker did "expect a layoff or had received advance notice of a layoff or plant or business closing." This inquiry, which contains no information on either the type or timing of notice, was 6. Information from the DWS is obtained for regular CPS respondents who answer affirmatively the question, "In the last 5 years, that is, since January 1983, has (he/ she) lost or left a job because of a plant closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which (he/she) was not recalled, or other similar reasons?" (emphasis added). Two types of evidence indicate that early job leavers answer this question in such a way as to be included in the supplement. First, more than an eighth of the sample analyzed below is out of work for less than 1 week before starting a new job. Such abbreviated joblessness is likely to be common only for persons finding new employment prior to displacement. Second, the 1984 and 1986 DWS supplements, which use identical inclusion criteria to the 1988 supplement, obtain a substantial proportion of affirmative replies to a question asking whether the worker did "leave that job before (he/she) would have been laid off." For example, Fallick (1991) , who focuses specifically on this issue using the 1986 DWS, finds that 9.3% of displaced workers involved in plant closings (and 16.8% of this group who also receive advance notice) are premature job leavers.
Advance Notice and Postdisplacement Joblessness 5 also incorporated in the 1984 and 1986 DWS supplements and provided the only information on early notification available to previous researchers. The two questions added to the 1988 DWS ask if the respondent had "been given written advance notice that the business would be closed or that he/ she would be laid off" and, if so, "how long before he/she was to be laid off did he/she receive that notice?" Responses to the last question were categorized into the following ranges: less than 1, 1-2, and greater than 2 months.
The regression analysis includes covariates for a wide variety of individual, job, and geographic characteristics. These are described in the Appendix. In addition to data obtained from the DWS and attached CPS, regressors were constructed using information from other sources. Variables indicating the state, industry, and occupation unionization rate and a dummy variable for residing in right-to-work states were included to proxy for collective bargaining status on the predisplacement job. The occupation unemployment rate, state or standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) unemployment rate, and the average industry employment growth rate were added to account for differences in economic conditions across localities and employment sectors.7 Variables measuring the predisplacement wage residual and predicted probability of receiving unemployment insurance benefits ( conditional on positive unemployment) were also included.8
III. Frequency of Advance Notice
A slight majority (53.0%) of displaced workers anticipated their job loss, but only 15.1% received written advance notice of it, and just 5.0% were provided with formal announcements at least 2 months before the termination (see table 1, row 1).9 The percentage of workers with any 7. The DWS identifies geographic location at the survey date rather than at the time of displacement. Since approximately 19% of the sample changed location between the latter and former period, this could lead to biased estimat es of local labor market effects. To the extent that respondents are more likely to move out of depressed areas and into locations with low unemployment, this leads to an understatement of the impact of regional conditions. Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) and Howland and Peterson (1988) compare estimates with and without movers included in the sample and conclude that these biases are quite small. 8. Some previous researchers (e.g., Addison and Portugal 1987a) have controlled for the actual receipt of unemployment insurance (UI) rather than the conditional probability. The receipt of UI is endogenous, however, since workers avoiding nonemployment are generally ineligible for benefits. Persons receiving benefits will therefore almost certainly have longer average joblessness, even in the absence of a true UI effect. 9. These percentages were calculated directly from the DWS sample. Virtually identical percentages were obtained after adjusting for population weights. The weighted proportions are that 52.3% expected displacement, 15.1% received written notice, and 5.1% obtained written notification exceeding 2 months.
Advance Notice and Postdisplacement Joblessness 7 type of notice is similar to the 55% and 56%, respectively, calculated by Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) from the 1984 and 1986 DWS. The proportion with written advance notice is also close to that in a General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of representative establishments; analysis of the GAO data revealed that 81% of workers received less than 1 month's warning and only 5% obtained over 90 days' notice in 1983-84 (U.S. General Accounting Office 1987).10 The GAO defines notice to include specific information (whether verbal or written) concerning the date of displacement and workers affected. The similarity of the GAO numbers to those for written notification in the DWS suggests that precise verbal information is rarely provided.11 This implies that most workers who report that they "expected" their jobs to terminate, in the absence of written notice, probably also lacked specific unwritten information on when and whether the layoff would occur.
Notified workers tended to be older, had greater job seniority, and more often worked in slow-growing industries or occupations than their nonnotified counterparts. They more frequently lost jobs that provided group health insurance and were located in industries, occupations, and states with relatively high unionization rates. Nonnotified individuals were relatively often nonwhite and displaced because of partial layoffs rather than plant closings (see table 1, cols. 2 and 3).
The distinction between formal and informal notice is sometimes important. Nonwhites received written notification more often than whites but less frequently obtained informal warnings. The relative probabilities of acquiring lengthy formal notice were much greater for respondents with high job seniority, group health insurance coverage, and full-time work and for those affected by plant closings. Thus, 89.6% of displaced persons receiving more than 2 months' written notice left positions providing group health insurance, 72.6% were involved in plant closings, and the average job tenure of this group exceeded 9 years. The corresponding percentages for nonnotified respondents were 59.0% and 44.8%, respectively, and their mean seniority was just 4.5 years.
Appendix table Al shows the results of maximum-likelihood probit and ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables represent various types of advance notice.12 These regressions show that, in addition to the 10. See Brown (1987) for further discussion of the GAO study. A recent Conference Board survey (Berenbeim 1986) suggests that advance notice is provided more frequently. These findings are questionable, however, because of the nonrepresentativeness of the sample and frequency of nonresponse. 11. If specific unwritten notices were provided with any frequency, then the GAO percentages would be much higher than those for written notification in the DWS. 12. The dependent variable in the ordered probit model equals zero, one, two, and three for persons receiving no, less than 1, 1-2, and over 2 months' written notice, respectively. Ruhm above-mentioned groups, written notice is particularly probable for educated persons, respondents in multiple earner families, recipients of positive wage residuals, and those residing in tight local labor markets or states with legislation mandating advance notice.
There is evidence that prenotification is provided nonrandomly. To some degree this is not surprising. Unionized and long-seniority workers are expected to have high probabilities of being notified. That advance notice propensities also increase with education, wage residuals, number of earners in the household, health insurance coverage probabilities, and economic health of the local labor market suggests that prenotification is a normal good that workers demand more of as their compensation increases.
IV. Advance Notice and Joblessness:
Descriptive Information
Most workers experience significant nonemployment following permanent job losses. For example, Ruhm (1991a) calculates that the average displacement leads to approximately a 12-week increase in unemployment, Dyer a 2-year period. Adding in the extra time out of work occurring during periods of labor force nonparticipation and that which would have been expected even in the absence of the termination (e.g., due to temporary Layoffs), total postdisplacement joblessness is significantly greater. Respondents in the 1988 DWS averaged 27.4 weeks out of work in the initial spell of nonemployment; 35.4% were jobless more than 6 months, and 12.8% for over 1 year (table 2, col. 1).13
Notified workers avoided joblessness more frequently than their counterparts and had a greater chance of being reemployed at the survey date.14 Of this group, 13.9% experienced less than 1 week of postdisplacement joblessness, compared to 9.6 percent of their nonnotified peers (table 2, row 2). In January 1988, 74.7% of the former group were reemployed, versus 71.5% of the latter (see table 2, row 9). Workers receiving over a month of written advance notice were even more likely to find immediate reemployment.
There is scant evidence, however, that prior notification substantially reduces the incidence of extended joblessness. An identical 33.5% of nonnotified and notified respondents were out of work for at least 6 months; among the various categories of written notice, the corresponding probabilities ranged from 33.9% to 37.8% (see table 2, rows 6 and 7).
13. These calculations underestimate the extent of joblessness since reports are top-coded at 99 weeks and are censored for persons continuously out of work between the employment termination and survey date. Similar findings for the 1984 and 1986 DWS are presented in Flaim and Sehgal (1985) ; Horvath (1987) ; and Podgursky and Swaim (1987) .
The negative probit and positive AFT coefficients on WRIT1 and WRIT2 indicate that short periods of formal advance warning, if anything, are associated with longer nonemployment durations. It is particularly striking that persons receiving written announcements less than 1 month before the layoff date were predicted to be jobless 38% longer than their nonnotified counterparts. This result barely misses being statistically significant.22 in joblessness associated with advance notice because they do not adequately account for predisplacement search. Section VII of this article suggests that they also fail to take important endogeneity biases into account.
The relationship between advance notice and longer-term employment stability
was also examined by estimating a probit model of the probability of working for pay in January 1988. Coefficients on UNWRIT, WRIT1, and WRIT3 were positive Ruhm Since written notification generally provides more detail about the date and nature of impending displacements than informal notice, it is implausible that the latter speeds reemployment while the former retards it. A more probable explanation is that the reduced-form regression model is misspecified because it fails to account for the potential endogeneity of advance notice. This possibility is addressed in Section VII.
C. Advance Notice Interactions
Coefficients on the interactions between advance notice and other covariates, obtained from the regression model specified by equations (11b) and (8) Important variations are observed in the effects of advance notification. Particularly noteworthy are the large reductions in joblessness associated with lengthy periods of formal notice for household heads, women, nonwhites, and displaced workers living in areas with high unemployment. Substantial benefits were also obtained by persons departing jobs in occupations with low unemployment and possibly in rapidly growing industries (see table 5, cols. 5 and 6).
Comparing the results in columns (1) and (2) to corresponding coefficients in columns (5) and (6) in table 5 provides further evidence that the measured impact of informal notice differs markedly from that of written prenotification of the type now mandated by law. For instance, unwritten warning is of relatively limited value to heads of households, women, and minorities, whereas exactly the opposite is true for lengthy written notice. The large beneficial effect of formal announcements for workers in depressed local labor markets is not replicated when considering informal notice, but large decreases in joblessness for notified part-time workers are observed in the latter case. Signs on the interaction coefficients are also reversed for marital status, health insurance, plant closings, state union densities, and residence in right-to-work states. These findings further qualify the usefulness of previous research using broad definitions of advance notice that include expectations of job loss in the absence of written announcements.
D. Summary
Informal notice is correlated with substantial reductions in postdisplacement joblessness. This finding is consistent with earlier research utiwhile that on WRIT2 was negative. The predicted effect was fairly small in all cases, however, and the t-statistic never exceeded 0.71. This suggests that prior notification either has no effect or slightly improves future employment prospects.
lizing broad definitions of prenotification. The results are new and dramatically different, however, when attention is restricted to the written notice now mandated by law. Formal announcements received at least 2 months before permanent layoffs were associated with smaller increases in the likelihood of avoiding joblessness and with no reductions in the average durations. More substantial benefits were observed for heads of households, women, nonwhites, and persons residing in depressed local labor markets. Shorter periods of written notice neither reduced durations nor increased probabilities of moving directly into new jobs. The point estimates actually imply longer joblessness, which may indicate the failure to account for endogeneity in the provision of advance notice. The results also suggest serious shortcomings in previous analyses that have relied on broad definitions of prenotification.
VII. Endogenous Advance Notice
Prior to 1989, only three states (Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii) required employers to provide advance notification of impending terminations. Reduced-form models estimated using the DWS therefore indicate the relationship between voluntarily provided advance notice and postdisplacement joblessness. If firms warn employees on a nonrandom basis, these estimates may poorly indicate the impact of mandated prenotification.
Endogeneity bias could cause the prenotification effect to be either underor overstated. If firms more frequently notify workers in depressed local labor markets rather than in healthy ones (in order to minimize premature quits), then early warning is likely to be associated with small reductions or even increases in joblessness. This occurs because new employment is especially difficult to obtain when local unemployment rates are elevated. Conversely, if individuals with a special aversion to unemployment both work for employers providing notice and are less selective in the positions they will accept, then, following terminations, advance notice will be negatively correlated with postdisplacement joblessness, even if there is no "true" notification effect.23
Two additional factors are likely to cause the benefits of informal notice to be overestimated. First, workers who are particularly well informed about labor market conditions will both anticipate job losses and rapidly find new employment more often than their counterparts who are less knowledgeable. Second, ex post rationalization may lead persons with satisfactory reemployment experiences to respond that they anticipated 23. Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988) provide the most extensive analysis to date of the endogeneity problem but are unable to resolve it with any satisfaction. They conclude, "We are skeptical of our ability to use the estimates obtained here to control for the endogeneity of advance notice in the duration of nonemployment and postdisplacement wage equations" (p. 45).
Ruhm displacements, while those with greater difficulties report being surprised by involuntary terminations.
Conversely, an artifact of the DWS questionnaire procedures may result in the gains from formal notice being understated. The problem occurs because the survey fails to ascertain whether job terminations are anticipated prior to the receipt of written announcements. To the extent that they are, formal notice is likely to be disproportionately obtained by workers with low reemployment probabilities, as persons with better employment alternatives are more likely to leave the firm prior to the time at which t he written notice is provided. A more detailed discussion of this sorting bias is included in the Appendix.
A. Testing for Endogeneity
The search model suggests that prenotification should either speed reemployment or have no effect on expected durations. The former result occurs if early notice increases the time or intensity of predisplacement search, the latter if advance warning has no effect on search behavior. There is no theoretical reason why advance notice should ever delay reemployment. Evidence that early announcements are associated with increased joblessness therefore provides a clear indication that they are disproportionately provided to workers with low hazard rates. In this case, reducedform estimates understate the benefits of prenotification.
Section VI B showed that formally notified individuals have relatively lengthy nonemployment spells, suggesting the importance of the justmentioned endogeneity bias. Confirming evidence is obtained by examining the cumulative reemployment probabilities of notified and nonnotified workers. The probability that an individual with observable characteristics X and notification status N becomes reemployed within a maximum of t periods is F(tX, N) . The search model implies that F(tX, N = 1) will be at least as great as F(tX, N = 0), for any given t, unless notified workers possess unobserved characteristics associated with delayed reemployment.
Cumulative reemployment probabilities (hereafter simply denoted as "reemployment probabilities") through durations of 18 weeks are displayed in table 6. The first panel shows actual percentages of workers with spells ending within the specified time period. The second panel displays predicted probabilities for a hypothetical worker with personal, job, and geographic characteristics equal to the sample averages. These estimates are obtained from probit models that include the full vector of covariates, with the dependent variable equaling one (zero) if nonemployment is le ss than or equal to (greater than) the specified number of weeks.
At durations of 2 weeks or more, predicted reemployment probabilities are uniformly lower for workers receiving written notice than for their counterparts surprised by displacements. For instance, the hypothetical worker has a 0.433 probability of ending joblessness within 8 weeks if no Advance Notice and Postdisplacement Joblessness 21 notice is provided (see table 6, col. 1). This compares to probabilities of 0.392, 0.363, and 0.361, respectively, if less than 1, 1-2, or over 2 months' written notice is obtained ( cols. 3-5) . Similarly, the predicted probability of reemployment within 18 weeks is 0.579 without prenotification versus 0.504, 0.516, and 0.471 if the respective durations of formal notice are received.24
Despite the extra time available for search, formally notified workers have longer nonemployment durations than their observably similar counterparts who do not expect displacements. Written announcements are therefore disproportionately received by persons who, controlling for observable characteristics, have low hazard rates. This could result from the previously mentioned sorting process and certainly indicates serious biases in the reduced-form regressions. It is also noteworthy that predicted reemployment probabilities of formally notified workers are always lower than corresponding sample rates. This shows that written announcements are 24. The differences in predicted reemployment rates become even more pronounced beyond 18 weeks. nounced for lengthy spells. For instance, the probability that the hypothetical worker's spell ends within 53 weeks is 89.4% when notice is received. If the termination were unexpected, however, then the corresponding 54-week reemployment probability is only 87.4%. This seemingly small difference is more dramatic when survival rates are considered. Informally notified workers have a 10.6% probability of remaining jobless beyond 53 weeks, nonnotified counterparts continue to be out of work past 54 weeks 12.6% of the time. Thus, corresponding survival probabilities are almost 19% larger for the latter group than for the former. The more rapid reemployment associated with informal notice is therefore at least partially attributable to this type of early warning being systematically obtained by workers with high hazard rates.
B. Endogeneity-corrected Estimates
This section develops a procedure for calculating endogeneity-corrected estimates of the effect of advance notice. The key assumption made is that prenotification reduces durations by raising the probability of avoiding nonemployment but has no effect on hazard rates once the spell of joblessness begins. This assumption is not entirely realistic. For instance, if individuals engage in systematic search, then both reservation and offer wages will decline with the period of advance notice. The reduction in reservation wages increases hazard rates, while the fall in expected wage offers lowers them. It is therefore not obvious whether prenotification will raise or lower hazard probabilities at given durations of joblessness. The empirical evidence suggests that the fall in expected wage offers dominates, 24 Ruhm Table 8 displays predicted 1-and 5-week reemployment hazards, evaluated with a nonnotification covariates set equal to the sample means. Hazard probabilities generally decline with spell durations, as is expected if the regressors fail to account for all relevant heterogeneity. For instance, 1-week hazard rates average 0.0669 between 1 and 4 weeks, 0.0477 between 5 and 8 weeks, and 0.0365 between 9 and 12 weeks. Displaced workers also appear to "round off " reported durations of joblessness. Thus, there is a jump in the hazard rate at 1, 2, 6, 12, and 18 months, as well as at 10, 15, and 20 weeks. The rise in reemployment hazards in the neighborhood of 26 weeks also suggests the effect of exhausting unemployment insurance benefits.
Nonnotified workers with sample-average characteristics are predicted to avoid nonemployment 6.9% of the time. This rises to 10.9% if written announcements are provided more than 2 months before the displacement and 12.0% if informal notice is received (see table 6 ). Substituting these values for F(01 X, N) and the hazard rates in table 8 into equation (12) and solving yields predicted nonemployment durations. They are 29.11 weeks for individuals surprised by displacements, 28.11 weeks for the informally notified, and 28.70 weeks for workers receiving more than 2 Ruhm months' written notice.28 This implies that prenotification reduces average postdisplacement joblessness by between 0.41 and 1.00 weeks.
It is instructive to compare these findings to the reduced -form estimates of this and previous research. The model in Section VI B yielded the prediction that informal notice decreases durations by approximately 1 month. This result accords closely with earlier studies examining broad measures of prenotification using the 1984 and 1986 DWS. In contrast, formal notification was associated with longer nonemployment durations. As argued above, these findings fail to correct for important endogeneity biases that occur because informal (formal) notice is predominantly received by persons with high (low) hazard rates. The endogeneity-corrected estimates presented in this section indicate that prenotification reduces nonemployment durations by between 2 days and 1 week. This is only one-eighth to one-fourth as large as the estimate typically obtained by previous researchers.
V III. Su mmary and Con clus ions
The effect of advance notification on postdisplacement joblessness is analyzed using a new data source that differentiates between written notice and less formal types of early warning. This distinction has been largely ignored in previous research even though informal notification, which includes both verbal announcements and ill-defined "expectations" of impending displacements, is of limited relevance for the current policy debate on the efficacy of legislation mandating specific written notice.
Reduced-form estimates of the effects of formal and informal notice differ dramatically. Workers expecting terminations, in the absence of written notice, have higher probabilities of avoiding nonemployment and shorter spell durations than their nonnotified counterparts. Lengthy formal notice is associated with smaller increases in the likelihood of escaping joblessness altogether and with no decline in the average duration of nonemployment. Written announcements received shortly before the date of displacement neither reduce average durations nor increase the probability of avoiding joblessness.
Reduced-form estimates of the prenotification effect also vary significantly across population subgroups. For instance, durations are relatively short for formally notified household heads, females, nonwhites, and residents of local areas with high unemployment. The same differential effects are not observed when focusing on informal notice, however, which further 28. The need to calculate an infinite sum is avoided by noting that, with constant hazard rates, h, the expected remaining spell duration is 1/h. Thus, spells continuing past 92 weeks are expected to last for an additional 16.15 (1/0.0619) 5-week periods, or 80.78 weeks. Since respondents specify weeks of joblessness in integer values, there is some ambiguity as to exact spell durations. For this analysis, one-half week was added to all responses. The estimated impact of prenotification is insensitive to this assumption.
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Reduced-form models also fail to account for the possibility that prenotification is systematically provided to workers with high or low exit rates out of nonemployment. Analysis of cumulative reemployment probabilities indicates that informally (formally) notified individuals possess unobserved characteristics associated with high (low) reemployment hazards. This implies that reduced-form estimates understate (overstate) the beneficial effects of written (unwritten) advance notice.
A technique was developed to correct for this endogeneity of advance notice. The procedure assumes that prenotification raises the probability of avoiding nonemployment altogether but has no effect on hazard rates once the spell of joblessness begins. Using this approach, advance notice is estimated to reduce nonemployment durations by between 2 days and 1 week. This is between one-eighth and one-fourth as large as the typical estimate of previous research.
Future work should attempt to explicitly model the process by which workers become informed about future displacements. Until this is done, it will be unclear to what extent advance notice provides employees with new information. Greater attention also needs to be paid to variability in the effects of prior notification across population subgroups. As shown above, these differences are frequently larger than the average impact. The endogeneity problem likewise deserves more sophisticated analysis. Although prenotification is now mandated by the federal government, the legislation includes numerous, often vaguely specified, exemptions. This ensures that employers will continue to have considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to provide advance notice.
Finally, consideration of the effect of advance warning for subsequent earnings is needed. Recent research suggests that increased postdisplacement joblessness is largely transitory, while the associated wage changes are more permanent (see Topel 1990; Ruhm 1991a) . Thus, the main potential benefit of prenotification may be to reduce the earnings losses. One recent study (Ruhm 1991b) indicates that relative wage gains exceeding 10% are obtained by persons receiving lengthy written notice. These earnings effects, if verified by subsequent research, are substantially larger than the small reductions in joblessness focused on in this analysis.
